The recursive aspect of process reliabilism has rarely been examined. The regress puzzle, which illustrates infinite regress arising from the combination of the recursive structure and the no-defeater condition incorporated into it, is a valuable exception. However, this puzzle can be dealt with in the framework of process reliabilism by reconsidering the relationship between the recursion and the no-defeater condition based on the distinction between prima facie and ultima facie justification. Thus, the regress puzzle is not a basis for abandoning process reliabilism. A genuinely intractable problem for recursive reliabilism lies in the gap between the reliability of the entire path to a belief and that of its parts. Confronted with this puzzle, reliabilists can orient themselves toward ‘reliable-as-a-whole reliabilism’ instead of ‘reliable-in-every-part reliabilism’, including recursive reliabilism, which is found to be not well-motivated.
Process reliabilism, Defeaters, Infinite regress, Recursive definition
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