The Right to Know: A Logical Analysis

Réka Markovich and Olivier Roy [PDF]

Abstract

We study the right to know within the theory of normative positions. We do so by extending this theory with epistemic and (legal)-alethic modalities. We propose and discuss four plausible but nonequivalent formalizations of the right to know as an epistemic claim-right. We compare these formalizations on how they fare with respect to the so-called Åqvist’s paradox and detachment principles. Then, we briefly address the formalization of the right to know as a power. This article thus makes a conceptual rather than technical contribution: it maps the possibilities for understanding the right to know as a claim-right (and a power) and shows, more generally, how the theory of normative positions can make a positive contribution to our understanding of epistemic rights. We do not study the metalogical and computational properties of the underlying logic we use.

Keywords

Epistemic rights, Hohfeldian rights, Deontic logic, Epistemic logic,
Dynamic logic

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